Towards Consumer-Empowering Artificial Intelligence by Contissa, Giuseppe et al.
Towards Consumer-Empowering Artificial Intelligence
Giuseppe Contissa1;2, Francesca Lagioia2, Marco Lippi3, Hans-Wolfgang Micklitz2
Przemysław Pałka2, Giovanni Sartor1;2 and Paolo Torroni4
1 CIRSFID, Alma Mater – Universita` di Bologna, Italy
2 Law Department, European University Institute, Florence, Italy
3 DISMI – Universita` di Modena e Reggio Emilia, Italy
4 DISI, Alma Mater – Universita` di Bologna, Italy
marco.lippi@unimore.it, fgiuseppe.contissa, giovanni.sartor, paolo.torronig@unibo.it,
ffrancesca.lagioia, hans.micklitz, przemyslaw.palkag@eui.eu
Abstract
Artificial Intelligence and Law is undergoing a crit-
ical transformation. Traditionally focused on the
development of expert systems and on a scholarly
effort to develop theories and methods for knowl-
edge representation and reasoning in the legal do-
main, this discipline is now adapting to a sudden
change of scenery. No longer confined to the walls
of academia, it has welcomed new actors, such as
businesses and companies, who are willing to play
a major role and seize new opportunities offered
by the same transformational impact that recent AI
breakthroughs are having on many other areas. As
it happens, commercial interests create new oppor-
tunities but they also represent a potential threat
to consumers, as the balance of power seems in-
creasingly determined by the availability of data.
We believe that while this transformation is still in
progress, time is ripe for the next frontier of this
field of study, where a new shift of balance may be
enabled by tools and services that can be of service
not only to businesses but also to consumers and,
more generally, the civil society. We call that fron-
tier consumer-empowering AI.
1 Introduction
The history of Artificial Intelligence (AI) and Law started
about four decades ago. For most of its existence, this dis-
cipline has been primarily concerned with attempts to for-
malize legal reasoning and create expert systems. As such, it
was confined to the periphery of the mainstream legal schol-
arship, targeting an audience composed to a great extent by
legal theorists and logicians.
This has changed about in the last five years, owing in
large part to successful implementations of AI in numerous
fields of commerce. The focus of AI and Law as a disci-
pline has expanded beyond representation and reasoning. On
the one hand, a number of legal-tech applications have en-
tered the marketplace, often based on machine-learning and
data-driven approaches. On the other hand, policy issues have
become prominent, motivating many scholars to address the
social and legal challenges posed by the widespread use of AI
technology. Such a shift was, in our opinion, not only benefi-
cial but even necessary, dictated by a need to adapt to a chang-
ing world. In 2015, Gartner predicted that in three years’ time
50 percent of business ethics violations would occur through
improper use of big data analytics.1 At the same time, we be-
lieve that, alongside with addressing the challenges posed by
the uses of AI by businesses, interdisciplinary legal-technical
research should also focus on harvesting the fruits of AI and
bringing them to benefit consumers and civil society. Al-
though this new avenue of research will certainly build upon
the results achieved throughout the long-standing history of
the discipline, yet the scenarios we envisage will likely pave
the way to more focused methodologies, that will have to be
adequately characterized in order to be societally relevant.
The pervasive use of AI by businesses poses new types of
challenges to consumer law and policy [Helveston, 2015].
The synergy between AI and big data, in fact, enhances
the power of producers and intermediaries, and their domi-
nance over consumers. AI systems can use big data to antic-
ipate consumer behaviour and to try and trigger desired re-
actions. Hence, consumers can be outwitted, manipulated,
and induced into suboptimal purchases or other unwitting
choices [O’Neil, 2016]. Privacy is affected by these phenom-
ena in multiple ways: consumer data are continuously col-
lected by on-line and off-line consumer behaviour tracking,
they are stored and merged with other data sources, and pro-
cessed in order to elicit further information about consumers
1https://www.gartner.com/newsroom/id/3144217
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though profiling. The resulting indications about consumer
attitudes, weaknesses and propensities are deployed in de-
cisions affecting individual consumers, or in attempts to in-
fluence their behaviour. Consumers are mostly left in the
dark: they cannot be aware of how they are being monitored
and manipulated by AI systems. Moreover, they are unable
to contest the practices being implemented. Even consumer
organizations (collective entities representing consumers’ in-
terest) and public authorities have been thus far unable to
counter such practices, having no means to rival the resources
and technological superiority of the companies that combine
AI and big data, both Internet intermediaries and other large
commercial entities (maybe with the exception of national se-
curity agencies).
Yet, we should not consider AI to be necessarily only at
the service of producers and intermediaries. AI can also
be exploited to unlock consumer-empowering technologies,
that is those technologies and tools aimed to serve the cause
of both individual consumers (apps, browser extensions, en-
hancing understanding and autonomy) and their organizations
(automating oversight and law enforcement process). Such
technologies may support the creation of effective consumer
counter-power, fortifying the consumers’ defences, for in-
stance by protecting them against unfair or even abusive com-
mercial practices.
A number of early studies seem to indicate a growing at-
tention to this cause. However, we are only at the dawn
of consumer-empowering AI. Many are the open challenges
that still need to be addressed: protecting consumers against
unwanted monitoring and data collection, supporting con-
sumers and their organizations in the detection and contest-
ing of unfair uses of AI and more generally of Informa-
tion and Communication Technologies (ICT), enabling con-
sumers and their organizations to control the fairness of com-
mercial practice, and so on.
This is a great challenge both for AI and for the civil
society, as AI technologies are becoming increasingly inte-
grated in our lives of citizens. Among the challenges that
Wagstaff [2012] identifies in order for machine learning to
make an impact on society in the near future there is one that
stands out: it is the passing of a law, or the making of a legal
decision, that relies on the result of a machine learning anal-
ysis. Although legal decisions solely ruled by automatic sys-
tems are prohibited by some jurisdictions [Article 29 Work-
ing Party, 2017], we have no doubt that such a scenario will
become plausible in the close future, and that intelligent sys-
tems able to support citizens and administrations within the
legal domain will become available to the community.
This article offers a critical discussion of the evolution of
the field of AI and Law under this perspective, starting from
the early days, until the key challenges addressed by today’s
research, and proposes consumer-empowering AI as the next
frontier of this important discipline.
2 The Past: AI and Law from Knowledge
Modeling to Machine Learning
Until a decade ago, both the legal reflections on AI and the de-
velopment of AI models for the law had been mostly inspired
by the paradigm of logical inference and knowledge repre-
sentation [Gordon et al., 2009]. Only a few contributions
were devoted to the legal aspects of AI. They were mainly
about issues such as the legal protection of knowledge bases,
or the regulation of AI agents (contract and torts). These aca-
demic contributions did not address significant issues in the
legal practices, since most applications were limited to toy
examples. Even the successful projects, such as larger expert
systems for public administrations, did not raise significantly
new legal problems.
The social and legal issues raised by AI systems developed
at that time were not different from those raised by equivalent
non-AI software. For instance, the issues consumers would
face when interacting with an on-line shopping system were
not unlike those they would face when interacting with a rule-
based system. Since both systems would operate on the ba-
sis of pre-coded knowledge, from the legal perspective, they
would raise the same legal issues, and be regulated accord-
ingly. Some case studies dealt with harms caused by faulty
software, or the validity of a contract including an unwanted
term because of a software error [Sartor, 2009]. Legal doc-
trine also addressed some AI-related issues [Allen and Wid-
dison, 1996], but few relevant cases could be found in legal
practice.
Research on AI applications in the legal domain started
in the ’70s and produced a number of models for repre-
senting legal knowledge and reasoning, namely rule-based,
argument-based, and case-based models (for an overview, see
[Prakken and Sartor, 2015]).
According to rule-based models, the law is viewed as an
axiomatic system, namely as a set of premises from which
legal conclusions could be achieved through logical infer-
ence [Allen and Saxon, 1994]. Once a legal text and a body
of facts have been clearly represented in a formal language,
the legal conclusions would follow from that representation
as a matter of deductive or defeasible inference. This enables
using logical formalisms for the analysis of concepts (on-
tologies) and clear drafting of rules, possibly including non-
monotonic techniques for representing rule-exception struc-
tures and legal hierarchies [Gordon et al., 2009].
Argument-based approaches stem from the consideration
that legal reasoning goes beyond the literal meaning of the le-
gal rules and involves appeals to precedents, principles, poli-
cies and purposes. Legal rules are not just applied but are
themselves the subject of reasoning, as in legal interpreta-
tion. But facts may also be the subject of legal reasoning,
that is reasoning about how a fact can be proven to be true
or false. Such reasoning is carried out in the form of legal
argumentation. A formal model of legal argumentation pro-
vides for the representation of arguments and their relations,
and for the specification of their semantics. Researchers in
AI and Law have produced a variety of computable models
of legal argumentation [Verheij, 2003; Gordon et al., 2007;
Prakken, 2010] that widely differ for such characteristics.
Case-based models represent legal cases so that a com-
puter program can reason over cases by analogy. In par-
ticular, they provide methods to compare a new case with
past cases, select the most relevant among them, and gen-
erate legal arguments by for and against a conclusion in a
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new case. A legal case has various aspects to be represented
(fact, concepts, factors) each with its own modes of reason-
ing: determining the facts, classifying the facts under legal
concepts or conditions, and deriving legal consequences from
the classified facts [Ashley, 1991; Prakken and Sartor, 1998;
Horty and Bench-Capon, 2012; Prakken et al., 2015].
However, it must be noted that research in AI & Law has
mainly focused on theoretical aspects and has seldom reached
the marketplace. In fact, several systems have been developed
according to one of the three models mentioned above, or a
combination thereof, but they have had limited practical ap-
plications, with the exception of several rule-based systems.
One of the few successful commercial products of this type
is a system developed in Australia, originally named Softlaw,
which was later renamed Ruleburst and eventually became
Oracle’s Policy Automation system. The system, used in
many applications for the Public Administration in Australia,
UK and US, includes a set of tools for building knowledge-
bases of regulations, for checking their correctness and con-
sistency and for using them interactively.
Some attempts have been done also in the domain of con-
sumer law. A prominent example is the Latent Damage Sys-
tem [Capper and Susskind, 1988]. Yet, such systems did not
have a significant impact on legal practice. The main reason
boils down to a general problem of knowledge-based systems,
known as the knowledge representation bottleneck. The legal
knowledge to be employed by the computational models of
such systems, in fact, had to be manually extracted from legal
sources, including statutes, regulations, cases, contracts, and
other texts. Thus, human experts had to read the legal texts
and represent relevant parts thereof in a form that could be
interpretable for computational models. Such a process was
slow and labor-intensive. The same problem emerged when
the knowledge had to be revised, for example when new laws
had to be added to the knowledge base, or abrogated laws
had to be removed. Consumer law particularly suffered from
having to deal with heterogeneous and dynamic material, in-
cluding contracts, policies, and unstructured textual sources
with different legal value.
Research in AI and Law has evolved in the last years, giv-
ing rise to a number of applications of machine learning and
text analytics to the legal domain. These include: (1) le-
gal text analytics for identifying and representing legal con-
cepts, to define kinds of annotations, concepts, and relations
in documents [Grabmair et al., 2015]; (2) machine learning
to manage complex non-structured information sets through
machine learning techniques (“predictive coding”) [Privault
et al., 2010] and to recognize facts and discussions in legal
cases [Wiltshire Jr et al., 2002]; (3) analysis of information
from statutory texts, to classify paragraphs of statutory texts
in terms of conceptual ontologies [Boella et al., 2012], to ex-
tract legal rules or norms [Wyner and Governatori, 2013], and
to compare regulatory rules across jurisdictions [Savelka et
al., 2014]; (4) extraction of arguments from cases, identify-
ing the structure of arguments [Mochales Palau and Moens,
2011], the claims, and the substantive legal factors [Ashley
and Bru¨ninghaus, 2009]; (5) prediction of the outcome of ju-
dicial cases [Katz et al., 2017]. The current challenge is to
integrate computational models for legal reasoning and ar-
gumentation with machine learning approaches aimed at ex-
tracting the relevant knowledge [Ashley, 2017]. One of the
most promising AI applications in the legal domain is the use
of the IBM Watson technology to deliver QA services2, by
extracting information from vast sets of legal documents, af-
ter being trained on the correlation between questions and an-
swers.
3 The Present: The Big Data Era and Risks
for Consumers
The character of legal scholarly reflection about AI has sig-
nificantly shifted over the last five years, as a response to
the wide-spread commercial success of AI implementations.
Suddenly AI, often discussed jointly with big data [Andre´ et
al., 2017], robotics [Balkin, 2015] and more generally “algo-
rithms” [Gal and Elkin-Koren, 2017], came to be seen as a
source of dangers and risks that need to be addressed by the
law- and policy-maker [Scherer, 2015].
Several initiatives aiming to ensure that the development
and use of AI will not pose substantial dangers to society and
individuals have been launched by academia3, third sector4,
governments [Cath et al., 2017] and business consortia5. Sub-
sequently, a series of scholarly articles and monographs have
been published. There are a few recurring general themes,
including the questions of liability for actions of artificial
agents [Vladeck, 2014], the legal status of artificial agents,
particularly the question of granting them a sort of “digi-
tal personality” [Bryson et al., 2017], the inexplicability and
non-transparency of decisions made by machine-learning-
powered systems [Doshi-Velez et al., 2017], fairness [Helve-
ston, 2015] data-bias and discrimination [Kim, 2017]. It also
appears that the attention of legal academics has been at-
tracted especially by some specific sectors, such as competi-
tion law [Ezrachi and Stucke, 2016], high-frequency trading
of stocks [McNamara, 2016], self-driving cars [Schellekens,
2015] and smart cities [Eisen, 2013]. Among the suggested
responses we find making software source code public, cre-
ating administrative agencies to oversee the AI development
and deployment [Scherer, 2015], and granting the companies
using AI particular fiduciary status [Balkin, 2017].
In our opinion, initiatives aimed at addressing “legal prob-
lems caused by AI in general” will keep growing, as a result
of the snowball effect and the growing public interest in AI,
but their added value will soon come to an end. AI is not a
single technology; it includes many different approaches, that
are used for a variety of purposes by a variety of actors. Con-
sequently, the types of challenges caused by the use and de-
ployment of AI will vary, and so will the regulatory responses
they will prompt.
2See: ROSS Intelligence - Artificial Intelligence Meets Legal
Research: https://rossintelligence.com/
3See, for example, the Ethics and Governance of Artificial Intel-
ligence Fund at the Berkman Klein Center for Internet and Society at
Harvard University and MIT Media Lab: https://cyber.harvard.edu/
research/ai
4See, for example, the AI initiative of the Future of Life Institute:
https://futureoflife.org/ai-news/
5See, e.g.: Partnership on AI: https://www.partnershiponai.org/
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We believe that what is necessary right now is a sec-
toral, bottom-up approach, grounded in empirical research
and particular fields of law, executed in an interdisciplinary
dialogue of lawyers and engineers. Lawyers alone, being
normative scholars, are well-trained to identify social chal-
lenges and propose regulatory goals, but without an ongo-
ing exchange with engineers they risk talking not about what
AI actually is and does, but rather their sci-fi driven idea
of AI (e.g. machines will soon be conscious, and so they
deserve a status of persons), and proposing solutions that
are inoperable (e.g. making the source code public will in-
crease accountability of big-data driven algorithms). In our
current research [Micklitz et al., 2017; Lippi et al., 2017;
Lippi et al., 2018] we focus on the challenges to European
consumer law and policy stemming from the deployment of
AI by businesses6.
European Union’s consumer law has been created in or-
der to address the factual inequality in the relations between
consumers and business [Micklitz et al., 2017]. It contains,
among others, provisions regarding advertisements, obliga-
tory consumer rights, prohibited clauses in consumer con-
tracts and information duties on the side of the business [Re-
ich et al., 2014]. However, as the majority, if not all, branches
of the legal system, it has been created before the mass-
deployment of AI, and thus it is not perfectly suited to address
the more recent challenges brought about by it.
ARTSY7 is an ongoing project where we analyze the use of
AI by businesses through the lens of four general principles of
consumer law. These are: the weaker party protection prin-
ciple, privacy protection, the regulated autonomy principle,
and the non-discrimination principle, as identified by Norbert
Reich [2014]. After an empirical study of the spheres where
business uses artificial intelligence, we narrowed down our
focus to four sectors: advertising, data gathering, automated
decision making and personal assistants. In our opinion, one
should distinguish the new types of risks to consumers stem-
ming from the use of AI made by business, such as the risk
of replicating societal bias in advertising leading to discrim-
ination [Sweeney, 2013], from the challenges to enforcers
in oversight and detection, stemming both from the “black-
box” problem, and from background infringement happen-
ing inside computer systems, but invisible to the naked eye.
The former beg for wise regulatory goals and invite norma-
tive considerations of new types of questions. For instance,
should discrimination in advertising be prohibited? Should
price discrimination be regulated by consumer law? Should
profiling-based advertising be labelled as such? The latter
beg for wise governance structures, leading to an incentive
system that does not create chilling effects or impede inno-
vation, but at the same time successfully addresses the chal-
lenges created by mass AI deployment. There might be sit-
uations where standards can help, but there might situations
where, due to real-time flow of data, they just will not. Some
business sectors, e.g. medical applications, might require ex-
6The final reports will be available in July 2018 at the website of
the ARTSY project: https://artsy.eui.eu/
7ARTificial intelligence SYstems and consumer law and policy,
see https://artsy.eui.eu/
ante control of the products before marketing them, while in
case of others, e.g. recommendations-generating agents, it
might be sufficient to control them ex-post. A wide range of
available regulatory tools [Kroll et al., 2016] will need to be
transformed into a nuanced and diverse regulatory environ-
ment, with different solutions to different problems, depend-
ing on the type of endangered legally-protected good (health,
financial stability, non-discrimination etc.).
These challenges will need to be addressed by AI-
responsive consumer law, not only regulating, but also facili-
tating fair development and use. Several initiatives have been
put in place to debate these problems. However, we argue
that the field of consumer law and AI should not only focus
on addressing the challenges posed by AI. Presently, the mass
deployment of AI is the domain of business, but this does not
have to, and should not, remain this way. That is why, in the
next section, we speak about the potential of AI to empower
consumer and civil society, by creating tools that could help
enforcers control business behaviour, and increase consumer
knowledge, autonomy and ability to react.
4 The Future: AI for Empowering Consumers
As we witness the tremendous transformations in AI and its
application domains, in AI and Law as well we discern the
emergence of a growing phenomenon: the focus on the appli-
cation and development of methods and tools for empower-
ing consumers as a response to the power and technological
supremacy of companies and business. This sort of “counter-
power” yearned for by consumers is taking different shapes.
A first, straightforward application, is that of building sys-
tems capable of protecting consumers against unwanted mon-
itoring and data collection, or against aggressive advertising.
One popular instance of this problem is given by the adblock-
ing and anti-adblocking battle [Nithyanand et al., 2016] be-
tween publishers and consumers: on one side, companies aim
at developing tools for targeted advertising that exploit per-
sonal data of users, whereas consumers, on the other side,
need instruments that safeguard their right to privacy [Jin,
2018]. Currently, there are proposals that try to spread com-
promise solutions, named privacy-friendly advertising [Guha
et al., 2011], or frameworks that allow users to better control
the ads and trackers they are exposed to [Yu et al., 2016]. The
political world is becoming increasingly conscious of these
demands, as it is confirmed by the new legislation adopted by
the EU on the use of cookies.8
Similarly, big data mining techniques are more and more
often used to extract patterns from the personal data of
users, in order to support subsequent decision making pro-
cesses [Athey, 2017; Pedreschi, 2017]. Typical examples are
recommendation systems that suggest products to consumers,
decision support systems in the banking and loan market aim-
ing to profile and classify customers, and tracking tools for
browsing content. Yet, in these scenarios, the use of auto-
matic systems very often produces the risk of introducing user
discrimination, in terms of race, gender, social or cultural
status [Romei and Ruggieri, 2014]. In order to counter this
negative effect, some classifiers have been proposed that can
8http://ec.europa.eu/ipg/basics/legal/cookies/
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enhance fairness and remove prejudice in data mining tech-
niques [Kamishima et al., 2012]. Privacy-aware algorithms
and techniques have been developed as well [Ruggieri et al.,
2010]. Clearly, social networks represent the ideal ground for
these kinds of applications, and for these reasons there is a
growing interest in developing tools for personal data analy-
sis in social networks [Rieder, 2013], even by large compa-
nies such as Wolfram Alpha for Facebook.9
Another major aim of this “counter-power” paradigm shift
will be that of building systems that co-enable consumers
and their organizations to detect and contest unfair uses of
AI and ICT, and in particular to support consumers in con-
trolling the fairness of commercial practice. Some sys-
tems have been proposed, for example, to assess the trust-
worthiness and helpfulness of online consumer reviews by
analyzing sentiment and polarity [Salehan and Kim, 2016;
Villaroel Ordenes et al., 2016]. Other systems are devoted to
the automatic detection of unfair clauses in online contracts,
such as Terms of Services, using either rule-based systems
built on grammars [Micklitz et al., 2017] or machine learn-
ing systems [Lippi et al., 2017]. Such tools have reached a
considerable level of accuracy, and can be effectively used by
consumer associations as well as the general public. For in-
stance, in [Lippi et al., 2018] we show a publicly available
online system, named CLAUDETTE,10 for detecting poten-
tially unfair clauses in online terms of service with over 80%
precision and recall. We are currently extending the system
in order to cover data protection policy analysis as well.
As we discussed previously, AI-based technologies can
also be used to develop tools for the efficient retrieval of infor-
mation from huge data collections. Besides greatly improving
the quality of work of professionals in the legal domain, such
instruments could also be used by consumer associations as
supporting platforms whose goal is to protect the interests of
their affiliates. For example, the LawInsider platform11 pro-
vides a powerful search engine that manages over one million
legal contracts, while the Evisort12 platform, based on cloud
computing and AI techniques, provides tools for the manage-
ment of, and information extraction from, legal documents
such as contracts and provisions.
From a broader perspective, many other ICT sectors are
openly supporting the development of technologies aimed to
support customers and improve their quality of life. This
is the case, for example, of the telecommunications indus-
try within smart cities, where free connections that enable a
variety of services to the citizen are becoming common. Mas-
sive Open Online Courses (MOOCs) are another example of
a major technological effort to empower the people, not with
smart services but with knowledge, and are helping dissemi-
nating knowledge and culture all around the world [Pappano,
2012]. A similar momentum has characterized the movement
of Linked Open Data [Bizer et al., 2009], with a strong partic-
ipation of politics and civil society. The legal domain still lags
behind, possibly due to the presence of an initial knowledge
9http://www.wolframalpha.com/facebook/
10http://claudette.eui.eu
11https://www.lawinsider.com/about
12http://evisort.com/
barrier that is particularly hard to surmount. Like in other do-
mains, encoding and digesting high-level knowledge repre-
sents a critical bottleneck, which must be solved before such
knowledge can be put to good use and unlock services acces-
sible to the wide public. We believe, however, that AI could
help overcoming this barrier, by enabling tools and technolo-
gies that provide the public with information and knowledge
that otherwise would be hard (or even impossible) for them
to access.
We also believe that the AI community would benefit from
a positive impact of consumer-empowering AI on how AI it-
self will be perceived by the public. One of the next big chal-
lenges, for example, is the debate on data privacy. Even as
we write this article, the debate is prominent in the news,
with Facebook under the spotlight and the US Congress re-
thinking their data privacy legislation. Europe has been at
the forefront in data privacy law for a few years and reached
a milestone in 2016, when the EU General Data Protection
Regulation (GDPR),13 allegedly the most important change
in data privacy regulation in 20 years, was approved by the
EU Parliament. The GDPR is coming in force in May this
year. Organizations are now in the process of changing the
ways in which they process personal data, in order to comply
with the new regulation, whose violations may lead to heavy
fines. This involves changing the ways consumer data are col-
lected, processed and transmitted to third parties, which will
hopefully contribute to a fairer and more transparent interac-
tion between companies and consumers. However, as soon as
the milestone regulation is in place, the question remains of
the extent to which companies will really comply with the let-
ter and the spirit of the GDPR. Here is where AI can act as a
novel democratizing force able to offer effectively consumer-
empowering tools.
Our CLAUDETTE project is currently studying a partic-
ular, but crucial aspect of compliance, fairness and trans-
parency, namely, the drafting of privacy policies. Such poli-
cies are the documents through which data controllers in-
form users/consumers about the purposes and means of their
personal data processing, and possibly ask for their consent
(when consent provides the legal ground for the processing).
The question to be addressed is then whether the new privacy
policies will actually comply will the GDPR requirements
concerning the information to be provided to consumers (data
subjects), and how this information is to be presented. Ef-
fectiveness of enforcement is difficult, but crucial. How will
individual citizens actually notice if privacy policies are un-
lawful or potentially misleading? Do consumer organizations
have the resources required for following this up?
5 Conclusions
This work was motivated by two ambitions: an analytic one
and a normative one. In the analytic strand, we discussed
the transformation of the legal discourse about AI as a social
and technological phenomenon. We showed that the disci-
pline has existed for almost three decades now, with an initial
strong focus on theoretical questions of knowledge represen-
tation and formalization of legal reasoning. The focus has
13https://www.eugdpr.org
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indeed shifted about five years ago, when AI-powered ap-
plications started being widely used by businesses. AI as a
subject made it to the mainstream of legal academia, is cur-
rently being discussed from a variety of angles, and catalyzes
the attention of the public. However, the discursive frame
has changed significantly. AI is currently seen as a source
of threats and challenges, and as a phenomenon needing the
attention of lawmakers and regulators. Notwithstanding the
importance of these endeavours, we argue that legal scholars
should not restrict themselves to combating the challenges
posed by AI, but they should also embrace AI as a tool with
a potential to empower civil society and the consumers. Cer-
tain initiatives in this strand can already be seen, though they
still remain rather peripheral.
This is where our normative argument goes. We argued
that applied AI does not have to remain in the hands of big
businesses and corporations alone, but it can (and should) be
brought to individual consumers, their organisations (civil so-
ciety), as well as consumer agencies (public authorities), cre-
ated to represent and defend consumer interests. We believe
that the potential for this new direction is there. Some on-
going initiatives we surveyed seem to confirm that. However,
this will not happen without a political effort, since one can-
not expect the costs of such research to be funded by the com-
mercial sector. Likewise, political action cannot be born in a
vacuum, but it should be fostered by awareness. Sometimes,
as it has been observed in other similar contexts, such as the
movement for supporting net neutrality, it is thanks to ini-
tiatives arising from the population and the civil society that
significant steps forward are made.
We thus envision consumer-empowering AI to act as a fly-
wheel of change, by promoting awareness, and in a sense
democratizing AI, while enabling bottom-up initiatives and
incentivizing regulatory processes that would otherwise be
hampered by an apparent imbalance between citizens, or even
consumer organizations, and the big businesses holding data
and technology.
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